Compelled Disclosure of Internet Interconnection Agreements Creates Anticompetitive Risks by Lyons, Daniel A.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
6-19-2014
Compelled Disclosure of Internet Interconnection
Agreements Creates Anticompetitive Risks
Daniel A. Lyons
Boston College Law School, daniel.lyons.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons,
Internet Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel A. Lyons. "Compelled Disclosure of Internet Interconnection Agreements Creates Anticompetitive Risks." Perspectives from Free
State Foundation Scholars 9, no.22 (2014).
  
The Free State Foundation 
P.O. Box 60680, Potomac, MD 20859 
info@freestatefoundation.org 
www.freestatefoundation.org 
 
 
 
Perspectives from FSF Scholars 
June 19, 2014 
Vol. 9, No. 22 
 
Compelled Disclosure of Internet Interconnection Agreements Creates 
Anticompetitive Risks 
 
by 
 
Daniel A. Lyons *
 
 
Federal Communications Commission Chairman Tom Wheeler recently announced that the 
Commission had requested, and received, copies of interconnection agreements signed between 
Netflix and Internet service providers Comcast and Verizon. Going forward, the agency intends 
to review copies of similar agreements “across the board” between content providers and ISPs. 
The Chairman explained that the Communications Act gives the Commission “broad authority” 
to review interconnection markets, although he stressed that for the moment, the Commission is 
merely “collecting information, not regulating.”1  
 
This announcement has prompted renewed calls for the Commission to make these agreements 
public. Since Comcast and Netflix announced their interconnection agreement in February, some 
advocacy groups and technology reporters have asked that all network interconnection 
agreements be filed with the Commission and open to public inspection.
2
 Only by exposing the 
details of such agreements, they argue, can the public determine whether ISP business practices 
are reasonable or anticompetitive. 
 
While transparency is often a laudatory policy goal, this proposal is misguided and may 
ultimately harm the very competition that proponents seek to protect. Requiring ISPs to disclose 
the terms upon which they sell broadband access to consumers, as the net neutrality rules do, is 
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very different from mandating detailed disclosure of specific, confidential business-to-business 
agreements negotiated between sophisticated parties in a highly competitive interconnection 
market. It is a basic tenet of economic and industrial organization literature that sharing 
competitively sensitive information among rivals can facilitate tacit collusion. 
 
The Supreme Court, antitrust authorities, and even the Commission have stressed that disclosure 
of price and cost information can be harmful to competition, especially in markets marked by 
significant barriers to entry. Because of this potential effect on competition, the Commission 
should reject calls to mandate the public disclosure of interconnection agreements and instead 
limit itself to investigating actual instances of suspected consumer harm. 
 
The Competitive Interconnection Market 
 
Traditionally, the net neutrality debate has focused primarily upon the residential broadband 
market, and to a lesser extent, the market for commercial end-user broadband access. This 
market generally functions as a simple subscription-based model where the consumer buys a 
publicly-advertised monthly plan for Internet access. Specific price points are usually a function 
of one’s monthly data consumption, the maximum speed at which data is delivered, or both.  
 
But upstream in the Internet ecosystem, the interconnection market is much more complex and 
dynamic. Interconnection agreements stitch together the nearly 35,000 different networks that 
move information across the Internet. Some networks have nearly global footprints, while others 
operate only locally or regionally. Some focus purely on Internet transit, whereas others sell 
transit alongside other complementary services.
3
  
 
As one might expect in such a diverse marketplace, interconnection agreements contain wide 
variations in the terms under which parties exchange traffic with one another. Some parties buy 
and sell transit, while others focus on peering on a settlement-free or paid basis. Content 
providers unsatisfied with traditional transit and peering options can rely upon private content 
delivery networks such as Akamai and Level 3, which bypass the Internet’s backbone to help 
deliver content more efficiently to consumers. 
 
Price trends demonstrate the competitiveness of interconnection markets. Although pricing 
schedules are often governed by nondisclosure agreements (because they contain competitively 
sensitive information), there is a general consensus that competition has driven down Internet 
transit prices precipitously and continuously since the Internet’s inception. Consultant William 
Norton calculates, based on anecdotal surveys, that transit prices have fallen from $1200 Mbps in 
1998 to $0.94 in 2014, an average rate of 30% each year.
4
 Similarly, research firm 
TeleGeography estimates that American transit prices have fallen 26% annually from 2007 to 
2012, and the rate of decline is increasing.
5
 Streaming Media analyst Dan Rayburn notes a 
similar decline in prices by content delivery networks: he estimates that CDN pricing fell 20-25 
percent from 2012 to 2013, and he expects even greater declines in 2014 and 2015.
6
 
 
As I discussed in an earlier Perspectives from FSF Scholars paper,
7
 Netflix’s recent 
interconnection agreements evince the competitive evolution of that market. Netflix has 
traditionally partnered with third-party transit providers and content delivery networks to carry 
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its bits to consumers. When Netflix quality began to suffer as the result of an interconnection 
dispute between one of those transit providers and downstream ISPs, Netflix was able to avoid 
collateral damage by cutting out the middleman and instead directly interconnecting with the 
Comcast and Verizon networks. It has also built its single-purpose content delivery network, 
called OpenConnect, which peers with multiple ISPs to serve those consumers. For customers 
whose ISPs do not directly interconnect with Netflix or peer with OpenConnect, Netflix can 
purchase traditional transit service or rely upon one of many content delivery networks to carry 
content to consumers. Competition among these many interconnection options produces 
innovative new ways to deliver bits to consumers and keeps interconnection prices at ever-more-
competitive levels. 
 
Disclosure of Interconnection Agreements May Harm Competition 
 
The proposed public disclosure requirement threatens to harm the competitiveness of this 
Internet interconnection market segment. At first glance, the benefits of increased transparency 
can seem enticing: in theory, perfect competition assumes that buyers have perfect information 
about prices, and increased access to firm pricing can reduce search costs for consumers hunting 
for the best deal. But economists have long warned that in reality, increased price transparency 
can have anticompetitive effects by facilitating the negotiation and enforcement of 
supracompetitive prices.
8
 That is why for almost a century, the Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that “the exchange of price information among competitors carries with it the added 
potential for the development of concerted price-fixing arrangements which lie at the core of the 
Sherman Act's prohibitions.”9  
 
Federal antitrust authorities have similarly warned about the potential anticompetitive risks of 
transparency among competitors. The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division explain that “[a] market typically is more vulnerable to coordinated conduct if 
each competitively important firm’s significant competitive initiatives can be promptly and 
confidently observed by that firm’s rivals. This is more likely to be the case if the terms offered 
to customers are relatively transparent.”10 While the sharing of information among competitors 
can be procompetitive, “in some cases, the sharing of information related to a market in which 
the collaboration operates or in which the participants are actual or potential competitors may 
increase the likelihood of collusion on matters such as price.”11  
 
The FTC/DOJ Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors state that information 
disclosure is more likely to facilitate collusion if it involves (1) information about prices, (2) 
current, rather than historic, information, and (3) individualized, rather than aggregated, 
company data.
12
 Of course, the proposal to mandate disclosure of individualized interconnection 
agreements would raise all three red flags: it would reveal real-time information about prices and 
costs of transit and other interconnection services on a company-by-company basis.   
 
The Mechanics of Tacit Collusion 
 
Price transparency facilitates collusion in two ways. First, the open communication of prices 
reduces the uncertainty of negotiating a supracompetitive price. Because overt communication 
about price collusion is prohibited by the Sherman Act, firms seeking to collude must overcome 
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the difficulty of communicating indirectly to establish their target price. But as the Supreme 
Court explained in United States v. Container Corp., sharing current price data can solve this 
problem by signaling a target toward which others can move.
13
 In that case, suppliers of 
corrugated containers shared current price information upon request about the most recent price 
charged for a good. The Court noted that “[t]he exchange of price information seemed to have 
the effect of keeping prices within a fairly narrow ambit” because “[k]nowledge of a 
competitor’s price generally meant matching that price.”14 The result was a movement toward a 
stable, uniform price in violation of the Sherman Act.  
 
Once firms have established a collusive price, transparency also helps enforce the collusive 
agreement. Here, as the Supreme Court has noted, “[u]ncertainty is the oligopoly’s greatest 
enemy,” because of the difficulty of identifying and punishing cheaters.15 But price transparency 
eliminates that uncertainty and therefore facilitates enforcement. Economists Frederic Scherer 
and David Ross explain: “If…every transaction is publicized immediately, all members of the 
industry will know when one has made a price cut, and each can retaliate on the next transaction. 
Knowledge that retaliation will be swift serves as a powerful deterrent to price cutting and 
therefore facilitates the maintenance of tacitly collusive prices.”16 Because market players know 
that any attempt at cheating will bring a swift response, they are less inclined to defect from the 
collusive price in the first place. 
 
Here, the general risk of tacit collusion is magnified by several structural factors inherent in the 
interconnection market:  
 Concentration: Collusion is easier when fewer firms need to cooperate.17 Though 
there are roughly 35,000 networks comprising the interconnection market, 
proponents of transparency have targeted ISPs because they allegedly control 
terminating access monopolies to consumers. If their concerns are valid, 
transparency would ease efforts by those ISPs to control interconnection rates to 
end-user broadband networks.  
 Barriers to Entry: Building and operating a broadband network requires 
significant upfront capital, which helps insulate a collusive scheme from the threat 
of competitive entry.  
 Frequency of negotiations: Providers enter into regular and frequent 
interconnection agreements, most of which govern only a small portion of total 
traffic carried over a network. This makes cheating less likely because there is 
little benefit from departing from the collusive price in a single transaction, and 
competitors can move quickly to punish any defector.  
 Multimarket players: Firms in the interconnection market are customers as well as 
competitors. These multimarket contacts provide multiple pressure points with 
which to punish a cheater, which makes cheating less likely. 
 Complex agreements: interconnection agreements can run hundreds of pages and 
may contain thousands of terms, which can mask attempts by firms to 
communicate with one another.
18
  
 
The Federal Communications Commission has historically recognized the risk that transparency 
could facilitate collusion in telecommunications markets. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Commission openly pondered whether tariffing of rates by nondominant telephone companies 
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“impair[ed] competitive pricing and facilitate[ed] collusive conduct.”19 Although it ultimately 
found that the evidence of collusion was inconclusive on the record it had before it, the 
Commission explained that the possibility of collusion was one reason why it supported the 
detariffing of nondominant carrier services in the mid-1990s.
20
 The agency was uncomfortable 
with continued tariffing precisely because “[o]ne of the basic prerequisites for [] anticompetitive 
behavior is knowledge of a competitor’s prices.”21 
 
Empirical studies have proven the link between increased transparency and higher prices in other 
related contexts. One particularly noteworthy example involves railroad grain contracting. After 
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 allowed railroads to enter privately-negotiated agreements with 
shippers, Congress was concerned that railroads were price-discriminating against smaller 
agricultural producers. To correct for this possibility, in 1986 Congress mandated that the 
railroads publicly disclose all “essential terms” of agricultural shipping contracts, including price 
and volume.
22
 Several economists showed that the disclosure obligation had a significant and 
adverse effect on the price for railroad shipping.
23
 From 1980 through 1986, the authors showed 
that rates were declining, a result consistent with other deregulation studies. But the trend sharply 
reversed when the transparency obligation took effect in January 1987, leading to a 10-13 
percent rise in rates, after controlling for exogenous factors. The authors conclude that “contract 
disclosure and the increased reliance on posted tariffs facilitated rate coordination by the 
oligopolistic railroad industry, thereby leading to an increase in rail rates,” a finding consistent 
with an earlier study about the effect of transparency requirements on inland barge rates.
24
   
 
Non-Collusive Harm to Competition 
 
Even absent tacit collusion, transparency can have an anticompetitive effect based simply on the 
unilateral rational actions of market players. As the Federal Trade Commission has explained, 
coordinated information sharing “can blunt a firm’s incentive to offer customers better deals by 
undercutting the extent to which such a move would win business away from rivals.”25 Market 
participants typically offer discounts in an attempt to gain market share away from rivals. But a 
company is less likely to offer such a discount if competitors can quickly learn the details of the 
agreement and move to match. Because it would be unlikely that discounting would gain share, 
firms would be less likely to engage in discounting in the first place. Transparency also decreases 
the incentives for companies to price goods aggressively. When a firm lacks knowledge about its 
competitor’s prices, it has incentives to offer low prices in an attempt to beat the “unknown” 
deal. But when rival pricing is no longer unknown, the incentive to outbid unknown price terms 
disappears. 
 
In this specific case, disclosure of interconnection agreements may also have anticompetitive 
effects on adjacent markets for content and applications. First, disclosure may make it easier for 
networks to price discriminate against particular content, because they could more easily identify 
the transit networks that specific content providers use to deliver their traffic to the Internet, and 
can press for higher transit fees from those networks. Second, the disclosure of interconnection 
agreements will allow content and application providers access to competitively sensitive data 
about their rivals’ transit costs, which can raise risks of tacit collusion in upstream content and 
application markets. Third, content and application providers who are concerned about 
protecting this information may contract with networks that are not subject to disclosure rules, 
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such as CDNs, or they may attempt to self-provision transit service to avoid disclosing cost 
information to competitors, even in situations where it would otherwise be uneconomical to do 
so. 
 
Finally, even if the disclosure rule ultimately has no anticompetitive effects, the proposed 
obligation would impose substantial costs on the industry. Network providers would need to 
scrutinize interconnection agreements to assure that disclosure would not raise antitrust issues or 
otherwise reveal competitively sensitive information. Moreover, given that federal antitrust 
officials look skeptically at arrangements to share prices, the routine exchange of competitively 
sensitive information may attract antitrust oversight and trigger investigations of firms that are in 
fact innocent—investigations that are expensive to defend even if the target is ultimately cleared 
of any wrongdoing. Finally, given that this is a somewhat unsettled area of the law, even a firm 
with no anticompetitive intent may unwittingly incur liability. In such an investigation, the fact 
that the Commission has mandated disclosure would not be a complete defense if antitrust 
authorities suspect the company was misusing the disclosure regime to achieve an 
anticompetitive end. Each of these compliance costs would ultimately be passed along to content 
providers and consumers in the form of higher interconnection rates. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Economic theory, antitrust authorities, and empirical evidence all suggest that mandatory 
disclosure is unlikely to remedy potential anticompetitive conduct in interconnection markets. 
The publicly available evidence shows this is a vibrant, competitive marketplace in which 
content providers have myriad opportunities to bring their goods to consumers. Moreover, 
federal authorities have ample authority to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute specific 
interconnection practices that they believe may be anticompetitive. And antitrust law allows 
private plaintiffs harmed by allegedly anticompetitive practices to seek civil relief. 
 
These judicial proceedings are a far superior method of unearthing and punishing anticompetitive 
interconnection practices. Through the discovery process, the relevant plaintiff will get access to 
the terms of the interconnection agreement and whatever other information it deems necessary to 
prosecute the case. But the judicial process provides significant protection, backed by the threat 
of contempt, to minimize the risk that competitively sensitive information will be made public. 
More importantly, it does not run the risk of being misused for anticompetitive purposes. The 
Commission should trust that process to police abuses. It should avoid the temptation to ignore 
basic economic theory, antitrust authorities, and its own prior conclusions in pursuit of a public 
disclosure regime that is likely to harm the very competition that it seeks to protect.  
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member 
of the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an 
independent, nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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